## STATE OF MICHIGAN

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF OTTAWA

ADELINE HAMBLEY,

Plaintiff,
vs.

File No. 23-7180-CZ

MOTIONS

OTTAWA COUNTY, a Michigan
County; OTTAWA COUNTY BOARD
OF COMMISSIONERS and; JOE MOSS, SYLVIA RHODEA, LUCY EBEL, GRETCHEN COSBY, REBEKAH CURRAN, ROGER BELKNAP, and ALLISON MIEDEMA, Ottawa County Commissioners in their individual and Official capacities,

Defendants.

> R E C O R D of the proceedings had in the above-entitled cause on the 31st day of March, 2023, before HONORABLE JENNY MCNEILL, CIRCUIT JUDGE.

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: SARAH RILEY HOWARD, JD (P58531) Pinsky Smith, PC
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For the Defendants: DAVID A. KALLMAN, JD (P34200) STEPHEN P. KALLMAN, JD (P75622) Kallman Legal Group, PLLC 5600 W. Mount Hope Hwy. Lansing, MI 48917
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Friday, March 31, 2023

At 1:30:34 A.M..

Muskegon, Michigan

R E C O R D

THE COURT: Okay. We are on the record in File Number 2023-7180-CZ, Adeline Hambley versus Ottawa County and Ottawa County Commissioners. I'm Judge McNeill assigned to hear this case today. I'm afraid I do not know all of the attorneys that are here today, so I'm going to start -- I'm assuming you are Ms. Howard?

MS. HOWARD: I am, Your Honor. It's nice to meet you.

THE COURT: And then gentlemen?

MR. KALLMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. May it please the Court, Dave Kallman, along with my son Stephen. And we're here with Joe Moss, who is one of the defendants.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I have - The first is a motion regarding a preliminary injunction based on the ex-parte motion that $I$ signed I believe last -- or beginning of the month or the end of last month, that is our first issue. And then we also have your motion for summary disposition. So why don't we go ahead and get started on the
preliminary injunction issue.
MS. HOWARD: Thank you, Your Honor. Would you prefer argument from the lectern or from the counsel table?

THE COURT: From the counsel table is fine.

MS. HOWARD: Okay. Good afternoon, Your Honor. We're here this afternoon on our motion to extend the TRO that was granted ex-parte to a preliminary injunction pending the litigation of this case. Here in this case, Your Honor, we believe that extending the $T R O$ is appropriate into a preliminary injunction for a few different reasons. Under the four factor test that I'm sure Your Honor is very familiar with, all of the factors are present and counsel toward continuing with a preliminary injunction in this case.

First, the harm -- And I think they're both at the same time in my briefing, Your Honor, so that it would be more concise. But the harm to the public and the harm to my client is irreparable if the defendants are permitted to remove my client from her duly appointed position.

As I'm sure Your Honor picked up on in the briefing, there -- a dispute developed after we filed
the initial complaint, which led to the filing of our first amended complaint, as to whether or not my client was duly appointed by the prior commission before the current commission took office on January 3rd. Our position, Your Honor, is that she was duly appointed as the public health officer, and I'll address that issue in a second. But if you assume that we are correct under the law and that she was appropriately and duly appointed as the health officer under the law, it would be irreparable to permit defendants to remove her in the manner that they indicated they would be doing on January 3rd, within an hour or so of taking office, by announcing they were demoting her to the interim health officer and announcing who they planned to replace her with. That evidence is a plan and intention to replace her contrary to statute. And under the statute, there are certain conditions under which she can be removed, but she cannot be removed in that manner. Given the statutory protection under Michigan law that is provided for the position of health officer and the public policy reasons behind that, Your Honor, the harm would be both irreparable to the public and to my client if she were to be removed in that manner.

There is not really helpful or analogous cases that apply to this situation. However, courts have granted preliminary injunctive relief in cases where a public official would be removed contrary to the rights they have under statute. The one case which $I$ would call at all analogous here, the State Employees Association case, the court reversed a grant of a preliminary injunction, but that was because the -- there was actual cause alleged against the plaintiff and the state was honoring its obligation to go through the grievance process there. Here, there's absolutely no allegation whatsoever made of any wrongdoing and, indeed, there really could have been none in the first 60 or so minutes of taking office against my client, and there's every indication that they have no intention of honoring any protections for her position under the law. So from that perspective, Your Honor, the harm to the public and to public policy as it's been stated by our state legislature would be to permit exactly what state law says can't be done.

The harm to my client is her reliance on the terms under which she took the position, her almost 19-year career at the county and her economic interests in having the position, those and her
interest in honoring the duty she undertook when she agreed to take the position, Your Honor.

The harm to the defendants in comparison is minimal, if any. My client is the person that they chose to keep in the office until they can install their own person, and so clearly they didn't have too much of an issue with her, at least in the short term. As Your Honor knows, under the court rules, if you grant a preliminary injunction pending litigation of this case, we have to have a trial within six months. That's per the court rule. So at most, the situation would only be extended six months until a final decision was made by this court. And then at that point, either we'd won or they'd won, but there's a determination at that point about who -- who's correct and then the situation -- the injunction will be resolved at that point.

And finally, Your Honor, on the merits, I'll address the merits before we get to the defendants' motion, since that is the fourth and final factor under the familiar test.

My client, we believe, is likely to prevail on the merits. If you assume that my client was duly appointed in December, 2022 , by the prior commission then $I$ think the case is fairly clear that
on the merits we're correct. If you assume that the defendant's position on the law is correct and that this Court is required to ascertain whether or not the prior commission intended there to be a second confirming vote to appoint my client or if they intended to appoint her contingent on two things which we all acknowledge happened as it's written in the resolution, if you have to look at those intent issues, we believe we've alleged sufficient facts which we can prove and will be able to prove in discovery that the prior commission intended to have only one vote, and that's if you have to look at their intent if we have to take depositions of prior commissioners and the current commissioners. The reason we would look for discovery from the current commissioners, Your Honor, is about their understanding about my client's appointment prior to her filing the lawsuit and any contrary understanding that she was appointed -- belief that she was appointed under the law would be an admission against interest at that point.

If we're correct on the law and the law is
you look to the resolution that was passed by the prior board and whatever it says controls under the plain language -- if it's unambiguous, you cannot
look to intent and you don't need to look to intent -- then again, $I$ would say she has been -- you can conclude today she's been duly appointed, because the resolution -- the original resolution is very clear that she was appointed contingent on two things: The background check and the state HHS approval, which everyone acknowledges has already happened.

So in that event, under the reading of the
law that $I$ believe is correct, she still wins on their argument that she was not duly appointed. So from that perspective, Your Honor, we think we have a very strong position on the fourth and final factor of likelihood of success on the merits, Your Honor. Would you like me to address the defense motions or are you going to take those second, Your Honor?

THE COURT: You can go ahead and address those, also.

MS. HOWARD: That seems the most
 merits.

THE COURT: Yep.
MS. HOWARD: What $I$ would say
additionally, Your Honor, is that the defendants have
made a motion to dismiss under both the insufficient facts as stated claim and the no possible evidence to support these claims. Those are -- those are the main thrusts of their motion to dismiss.

The -- I'll go backwards and start with the no possible facts can prove these -- can prove this claim. It's clearly premature, Your Honor. The case law is -- it's well-known that a motion for summary based on the evidentiary record prior to any discovery being taken is almost always premature and I would argue it's very premature here. The defendant's claims are based on their argument that my client was not duly appointed and they argue that you would look to the intent by watching the video of the prior meeting and presumably by taking discovery from some of the prior commissioners. That's clearly a fact question to which I'm entitled to discovery on behalf of my client. And in that event, it would be inappropriate to grant summary disposition now on that position. It's also their position that you can rule on the pleadings now, Your Honor, fails for a number of reasons. So their argument that the law is such that you are -- that you need to and that you can look at the intent of the commissioners making the
motion versus the plain language of the resolution $I$ believe is clearly wrong under established law. And from that perspective, we should be granted summary judgment on those claims requiring interpretation of that position, not the defendants, Your Honor.

The other arguments that they have made $I$ think have largely been made irrelevant by the first amended pleading. I don't agree that we need to name the Ottawa County Board of Commissioners instead of the county and individual commissioners. But to the extent they're correct about that, we have named them in the first amended complaint and rendered that argument moot.

Their argument about governmental immunity
is -- similarly fails, Your Honor. Multiple claims that we have made in the first amended complaint wouldn't be dismissed by governmental immunity anyways. Individual defendants who are sued in their personal capacity wouldn't be dismissed by governmental immunity. The -- any claim for declaratory or injunctive relief that doesn't bring with it damages not -- not dismissed by governmental immunity. And then to the extent we're required to plead bad faith by the defendants, $I$ believe we've sufficiently done so in the -- in the original
complaint, but certainly in the first amended complaint where we argued that they have held up various routine aspects of the job that my client's been trying to accomplish, that they've been doing this for political reasons, that they've been trying to replace her with a political appointee, despite knowing what the law is, Your Honor, because they have a majority on the commission, all of that would be sufficient bad faith to get around any governmental immunity exception, Your Honor. There's nothing further required to plead that we're required to plead there.

As for the motion for sanctions, Your Honor, $I$ think that is probably the biggest stretch of all. These are hotly contested legal issues. There's absolutely no evidence of bad faith in the factual pleading or legal allegations and it's an issue of public concern. There would be absolutely no grounds for sanctions no matter who wins today, Your Honor.

Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Kallman?
MR. KALLMAN: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor.
And may it please the Court, Dave Kallman appearing on behalf of the defendants in this matter.

We'll rely on our brief, as obviously Ms. Howard has, also, but $I$ want to hit some points on a few things that she's brought up here.

In our opinion, there's no question that the individual defendants and Ottawa County should be dismissed from this matter. The proper party would be the board of commissioners. In the Crane case, they're the ones who act, they're the ones -- only ones with authority as a board to make any decisions regarding the health officer.

Next, the plaintiff's constructive termination claim has to be dismissed because plaintiff has admitted in Paragraph 28 of their complaint that she's not an at-will employment -- not an at-will employee. And that theory only applies to at-will employees who are fired for public policy reasons. She's not at will, so that count clearly needs to be dismissed.

As far as the immunity goes, again, as we pointed out, plaintiff has failed to allege and plead any exceptions to immunity. She's -- It's silent, both complaints, the original complaint and the amended complaint. We cited the cases. It's a mandatory requirement to plead the exceptions and they haven't.

So as far as any damages claims, because there are claims somehow for damages under injunctive relief and declaratory ruling and now with a couple of added counts, that standard has not been met. And furthermore, opposing counsel just indicated that bad faith is the issue. No, it's not. Under the immunity statute, it's scope of authority. Did the board act within the scope of their authority? They made motions. They passed resolutions. I understand plaintiff doesn't like them, but there's absolutely no argument that that's within the scope of the board's authority. She can disagree with them all she wants, but it's within the scope of authority. It's not a bad faith standard.

Again, it's our position, it's clear from the brief, and I'll go into this a little more in a minute, but Ms. Hambley was never appointed in December of 2022 as the permanent health officer, and we'll go through that.

Finally, plaintiff claims now that because she's added a couple of counts and some -- a few duties that she claims they're being infringed upon that Your Honor cannot consider the summary disposition motion at this time because of this amendment filed a week ago. However, Your Honor,
that ignores MCR 2.116(I) -- (I)(1), which clearly states:
"If the pleadings show a party is entitled to judgements as a matter of law, (C) (8), or if the affidavits or other proofs show there's no genuine issue of material fact, (C) (10), the court shall render judgment without delay."

So I'm going to -- I'm going to address those, but it's our opinion Your fonor can deal with the complaint as a whole, even the amended complaint.

Now, I think the key issue here, and Ms. Howard has hit on it and this is going to be, I'm sure, most of our discussion is was Ms. Hambley appointed as the permanent health officer in December of 2022 as she claims? If not, her entire case collapses. There is no case if she was not appointed in December.

What does the plaintiff claim? That our clients' fired or demoted her illegally. And what proof does she offer to support that claim? Page 4 of their brief, that the December unlawful resolution that was passed and signed by the board chair and the clerk controls. That alone -- that document alone controls everything else. No other admissible
evidence is offered. Parole evidence does not allow the Tavernier case, we put that in, all those things are in our brief.

Plaintiff claims that the unlawful secret December resolution trumps the actual motion and the official board meeting -- minutes that was put in place by the board back in December of 2022 - - not the current board, the last board. They made a motion. It's on the record. They have official minutes. And nobody claims those minutes are inaccurate. Those minutes, they're saying, are irrelevant. They don't matter. It's the later resolution that was signed, only by the chairperson and the clerk, which changed the -- the motion and the minutes and the minutes as they were laid out. And we'll get into that. But they're saying the resolution controls, Judge, ignore the minutes. Don't even look. Don't look over there. The resolution controls. We don't think that's the law and I'll go through why.

The board speaks through its official minutes and its lawful resolutions, that's Tavernier, again. Plaintiff cites no legal authority for her claims here, for her position. There's not a single case in her briefs refuting what -- what we put in
our brief, nothing.
And even if this Court accepts this proof and somehow agrees, well, this resolution somehow trumps the actual -- what actually happened, the meeting and the actual official minutes, her case still collapses. And why is that? Because this unlawful December resolution changed the full board vote and action and it changed in secret out of the public view. This is a clear Open Meetings Act violation, an OMA violation. Again, plaintiff offers no response to our briefs on this issue, other than an endless insistence that somehow this unlawful resolution controls, as she's just stated now. Plaintiff fails to dispute the Lockwood decision, which we cite in our briefs, that makes it -- and any unlawful resolution is void on its face. It's of no force and no effect. Lockwood, it's clear, no case law has been provided to this Court refuting that clear case law.

Your Honor, no other discovery is needed. These facts are not changing. What happened was the past board, at their last meeting on December 13 th of 2022, had a meeting. Ms. Hambley's appointment was not on the agenda. They amended their minutes -- or not the minutes, they amended their agenda at the
meeting, which is their right to do, and they added that issue onto the agenda for that day for that meeting. And then the motion was passed, and we've attached the exhibits and $I$ know the Court's had a chance to see that, but the actual minutes say exactly what was passed by the board. And these are the official minutes. It's the official record of the board. And these minutes were approved by the new board at their meetings in January. That's uncontroverted, Judge. No discovery is going to change that. That's what happened that day.

Then there was a request made to DHHS, the state agency, to check her background -- I mean, to check her qualifications. And the letters came back. It's kind of confusing as to which letter, but clearly the department says, okay, she's qualified. We're not disputing that. Nobody is disputing that. Those are facts, no dispute.

So, what happened next? Nothing until the January 3rd meeting of the new board this year. And what did the actual official record show? There were three contingencies that had to be met before Ms. Hambley was appointed current health officer, three contingencies, not two, as Counsel was just saying. They're ignoring the first contingency, approval by
the board of commissioners.
And when you think about it, Judge, that makes total sense, because everybody knows, again uncontroverted, nobody can be appointed to be a health officer until after the state has approved them for their qualifications. So on December 13th, it was a literal impossibility for the board to appoint her as the health officer. They couldn't do it and so they had to wait for the approval.

Well, they got the approval, I guess depending on which letter you accept, you know, December 20 th or December 21st, whichever one -honestly, that doesn't matter. We don't dispute that that came through at that time.

But then what did the board do after that? Nothing. They had a meeting scheduled for December 27th. They canceled it. No further actions were taken. All of these are undisputed, uncontroverted facts, Judge.

So then January 3rd, the new board comes in. They appoint Ms. Hambley as the interim health officer. And $I$ know you've seen the minutes from that meeting. These are all facts that won't be changed whether we had three years of discovery, you know, or three months. Those are uncontroverted
facts.

So the board in December 13 th last year approved a motion to authorize the board chair and the clerk to sign a resolution -- not create a new resolution as they claim, to sign a resolution that did what they told them to do with all three contingencies -- approval by the board, MDHHS approval, passing the background check. It was not a motion to authorize the board chair and the clerk to write up a more detailed resolution as Ms. Howard alleges. Where is that in here? It doesn't say that. It's a -- You're approved to sign a resolution to do the -- and to do exactly those things. There's nothing in there that gives them the right to change it or delete things from it, as plaintiff claims on Page 9 of their brief. The motion specifically stated what was required to be in resolution. They had no authority -- the board chair and the clerk -- to alter or change it.

Now, I know, Judge, they're here saying
now: Well, look, Judge, they didn't mean to do that. They meant to appoint her. Sorry, we kind of messed up. You know, I mean, that's not what we meant to do. Your Honor, the Tavernier case, parole evidence is not permitted. In fact, we're seeing this play
out this week at the state level. Our Attorney General Nessel just came out with a written opinion on this tax issue that the legislation that was passed reading the legislation means certain thing, that the tax rate cut is only a one-time thing for this year and then it's looked at again from there. What did we hear? Governor Snyder, Senator Meekhof, all the people screaming bloody murder, that's not what we intended. We meant it to be a permanent drop, that it can't be -- and you can't do this, blah, blah, blah. Well, guess what? It doesn't matter.

Public agencies speak through what they actually put in writing, just like this Court speaks through its orders. So it's kind of -- You know, if they didn't write their legislation at the state level correctly and it does something differently than they intended, it's irrelevant.

And we have not once in any of our pleadings said we want to get to the intent of the commissioners, as is alleged. I'm not sure where this is coming from. We have not asked for that. We're saying the opposite, that there is no intent for this court to look at. And under case law, you can't look at it. Parole evidence cannot change the
official records, period. The language is what the language is.

So then what did the board chair and clerk do after this was passed December 13th? They prepared and signed a resolution in secret to appoint plaintiff and intentionally omitted the first contingency, because it's not there. In that Exhibit E we attached, the resolution that they passed, they did that later, after that meeting. There was no public meeting. There was no transparency. There was no -- They violated the Open Meetings Act, the very thing they claim we're do -- that our clients are doing, they did. And they passed a resolution conflicting with what the board actually did. And again, their intent is meaningless. That's what they did.

Boards speak through their official minutes and their lawful resolutions, it's that simple -- lawful resolutions based on their actions at a public hearing. Now, boards don't speak through unlawful, altered and doctored resolutions signed later by one commissioner, not the whole board, done in secret without transparency outside the view of the public, because that's what's happened here. Now again, I'm not speaking to did they
intentionally, I'm just saying what happened, Judge. This is what happened. They had a duty -- My -Our clients had a duty to correct the illegitimate and unlawful resolution, that's Lockwood and other cases we cite in our brief. Any board action, including this December unlawful resolution, done in violation of the Open Meetings Act is not valid, is of no force and effect, Lockwood. Nothing has been given to you refuting that, that's the law in this state, crystal clear.

Therefore, since their altered revisionist resolution is void as a matter of law in the official minutes and the corrected resolution that our clients passed in February controls, plaintiff was not appointed as the permanent health officer last December. Because there was no subsequent vote, that third contingency was not met. There's no dispute, contingencies two and three were met, the MDHHS and the background check. The first contingency, another vote of the board, there's no dispute that never happened. There's been no claim it happened. These are all uncontroverted facts, Judge. No discovery is going to change it.

Now, it's interesting, plaintiff takes the holding in Hardaway - - the Hardaway versus Wayne

County case and tries to say that somehow supports her, and $I$-- $I$ honestly don't get that. That case dealt with a county resolution by a board of commissioners where nobody disputed the lawfulness of the resolution itself. Everybody agreed that was the resolution that was passed. Everybody agreed with it. It was lawful and correct. The case was only deciding, well, there is some ambiguous language in it. What does it really mean? It was fighting over what the language itself meant.

So that's clearly separate from our situation. We're not fighting over ambiguous language. We're fighting over whether or not the resolution was lawful or not. It did not accurately state what the board did back in December. Hardaway is completely inapplicable.

And so $I$-- you know, it's clear. And if they say, "well, no", as they are arguing, "well, we have this resolution, it was done. The board chair, one commissioner signed it, the clerk signed it, that controls. Don't look at anything else', that's then a violation of the Open Meetings Act. Lockwood, it's void on its face. And either way, they lose, Judge. And this is a legal issue. This is not a factual issue at all. No facts are in dispute on these
points that $I^{\prime} m$ giving you right now.
The board passed the motion as stated in the official and approved board minutes. And if you read through plaintiff's briefs, they conspicuously avoid talking about the minutes because they know that kills their case. And they ignore it.

One commissioner and the clerk made the decision to eliminate one of those three contingencies so it did not comport with the official minutes of the board. This violates the requirements that the board acts as a whole, the Crane case that we cited in our brief. Board -- Commissioners don't act individually. They act as a board and so it's a violation of the Open Meetings Act.

The current board properly and legally fixed this aberrant and unlawful resolution, corrected it February 28th. Plaintiff claims that this December resolution somehow supercedes or overrides the action of the board on December 13th in the official minutes. This makes no sense. And they offer no law to support such a novel interpretation. If the board truly intended to change the official board minutes and the board action, they can -- they can't do it through the act of the chair acting alone and the clerk signing along with them. That's not --
that's not permissible. You don't change the official minutes through that. There's a process for doing that. It's in the Open Meetings Act and that was not followed.

This further violates MCL 46.3. It
requires the board to only act by the votes of the majority of the members present. That did not happen with this resolution and, again, nobody disputes that, nobody. Therefore, under Lockwood, this revisionist resolution is completely void and of no effect.

Now, plaintiff admits in her summary disposition brief, Page 4 at the top, that twice in her complaint, Paragraphs 41 and 45 , that the wording of the February 28 th resolution basically means plaintiff was never appointed as health officer. She admits our point and it's in their pleadings and in their brief. The February 28 th resolution simply copied the exact language contained in the official minutes from the December 13 th meeting. They didn't change anything. They simply put it over properly under the resolution.

And this is exactly why plaintiff's case falls apart in its entirety. Since plaintiff admits this language in the February 28 th resolution did not
appoint her as the health officer then she has to admit the exact same language in the minutes of the February -- or the December 13 official board minutes also did not appoint her to that position. So the minutes didn't appoint her and she could not have been appointed, because MDHHS -- And we attached to our exhibits, they say in their rules and regs, you can't appoint anybody until we've given approval.

So on December 13 th, the argument that she
was appoint -- it's an impossibility legally, no way. Therefore, the plaintiff has admitted by the plain language of the motion and official minutes that she wasn't appointed in December. Her entire complaint must be dismissed because this is the hinge pin for everything. She was never appointed as health officer until the current board promoted her and appointed her in the interim under the terms and conditions of the January 3rd motion, which I know has been attached and the Court's seen.

There's no way plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief or declaratory relief or any kind of relief for a job she never held. It's that simple, Judge.

Let me put it like this. Your Honor hears a case. You make a ruling. Then you sign and date
an order. And then -- I don't mean you, Judge, but let's just say a hypothetical judge. And the judge does an order, signs and dates it, and then hands it to one of the parties and says, "here, go take that and if you want to change something in it or you want to take something out of what $I$ put in my order, yeah, go ahead. Make those changes as you see fit', and then that judge enforces the altered order, even though it conflicts with the judge's actual ruling. Now, does anybody sitting here today think that -- I mean, everybody would go: You're crazy. That's impossible. You cannot do that.

The court speaks through its orders. They get put in writing, they're followed. And if there's an error in the order, what do we do as lawyers? We come back to the court. Judge, there's been an error. We have to make a motion. We have to do something, try to -- get the transcript, try to prove the error.

That hasn't happened here. The act was done. The official minutes are clear. There is no dispute, that resolution passed in December didn't follow the minutes. The board speaks through its minutes and those minutes were approved later by the subsequent board.

So I ask where is there any proof that this resolution passed in December was ever brought out before the public, at a public meeting where it was properly noticed and people could come and question about this? Was there any kind of meeting at all? No. They just did it and signed it.

And again, I'm not casting aspersions on
anyone. You don't think it was a mistake -- It doesn't matter. It's all irrelevant. They speak through what they did and they're stuck with what they did. It's that simple.

This is exactly why the plaintiff in this case is arguing that they have the right to do this with the resolution and they openly admit doing it. This claim is ludicrous, Judge. Plaintiff can't show the decision to appoint her with only two contingencies -- with only two contingencies was ever done at a public meeting because it wasn't. There's no evidence to prove that.

Let me quote from plaintiff's brief -summary disposition brief, Page 9, plaintiff says -quote:
"When a motion is made for the sole purpose of proposing a more detailed resolution, the motion is nothing more, other than the
vehicle by which the resolution is introduced and subsequently decided."

I mean, do you catch what they're saying there? Look at what they admit in this statement in their own pleadings, Judge, in their brief. The 12-13 motion was only to propose a more detailed resolution. Oh, really? Where does it say that here? It doesn't say that. They're making it up. They're admitting they did something different than what the board approved on December 13th.

The motion is only a vehicle to introduce a resolution? What? This strange credulity, Judge. Where does it say that in here? It doesn't say that. They say, "the clerk and chairperson are authorized to sign a resolution to do the following", and they lay it out. There's nothing in here that says, oh, do what you want. If you need to change things around, go ahead. There's nothing like that there. And then finally, the resolution will be decided later, they say, subsequently decided. What? No, no. It was decided December 13 th. So they're trying to muddy the waters here, Judge. This other resolution - This resolution wasn't a subsequent decision. And if it was, they violated the OMA. There was nothing done in public.

So you see how either way they lose. There's no legal way they can prevail here, none at all. Plaintiff cites no legal authority for this claim. They -- Motions are only vehicles for them to change something out of the public eye later? I've never heard of such a thing. The motion did not state it was for the purpose of proposing a more detailed resolution. The minutes stated exactly what's there. This resolution was never introduced at a later meeting. It was never subsequently decided or approved at a later meeting.

It's crystal clear, Judge. Therefore, even under the plaintiff's theory the December resolution was not properly enacted or approved, it's an OMA violation. If plaintiff's theory is correct, Judge -- Let's think about this for a minute. If their theory is right, the OMA is a nullity. Might as well take it off the books. You don't need it anymore. County boards are free to do whatever they want outside the view of the public. The board can't pass a motion to have the board chair and clerk write up a resolution that contradicts the actual motion in the minutes is passed by the board. They can't delete or add language however they want or fill in their own terms. This violates Lockwood. It would
nullify and negate the OMA.
Plaintiff's requesting injunctive relief that will let them get away with their illegal activity, pure and simple. I'll just be blunt. They're proposing to this Court give us an injunction to allow our illegal OMA violations and everything we did here with this resolution to be upheld, that's what they're asking for.

If plaintiff prevails, it sets a terrible precedent. It opens the door to abuse of power and corruption on $a$ huge scale $b y$ county boards and the public will never know because they'll just change resolutions later after the meeting and do whatever they want and nobody knows. That's ridiculous.

Plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed. This issue alone decides the case, Judge. She raises some other things $I$ just want to touch on quickly here. I know I've been going for awhile so I'll try to be quick here.

The amended complaint, Judge. I just want to bring up a couple things. And again, I think the Court, based on these facts, can rule on this matter right now. But when we pointed out in our first brief that plaintiff had alleged not one specific duty that she was being denied or interfered with
from doing, not one, so now in the amended complaint they've essentially raised three new duties and then they added two counts. So let me talk about the duties just briefly.

One is this community dental center contract that she's claiming my clients interfered with that; second, this community health needs assessment survey that the hospitals do; and third, applying for grants. Those are the three things that she's claiming this is how the defendants are interfering with my job, my duties.

Now, it's interesting, these are the only three she could come up with and they're in the complaint after we've raised this, so let me go through them real quickly and explain how they're all meaningless and not true.

The first one, the dental center contract. Plaintiff alleges not one action by the defendants, not one. What does she allege? That legal counsel asked her some questions. Legal counsel was questioning some things asking for information, not the defendants. Legal counsel is not permitted to ask questions of county department heads as we're looking at contracts? That's interesting.

Secondly, Judge, you know what's omitted?

And this is, $I$ think -- Well, you can take it the way you want to take it. I know how I take it. Did you hear in their pleadings or anything that they put in there that that contract is in place for six more months; that that contract is in effect until October -- October 1st, 2023, six more months; that this is an extension -- counsel's office asked for some more information? We have six months to approve this contract. Nothing has been denied. We've asked for information, Judge. None of this interferes with her duties.

The board of commissioners is not
obligated -- obligated to blindly approve all of plaintiff's requests without any deliberation or oversight. So the Court understands, we've made a recommendation at this point and we're making a recommendation for one little change dealing with how Elliott-Larsen should be complied with in the contract. That is clearly within the scope of legal counsel's duties. Defendants had nothing to do with it. This kind of give and take is normal for contract review. And it's not like this contract died a month ago and now we're without it. This is a ridiculous claim. The bottom line, the board did nothing to interfere with her duties regarding this
dental center contract.
Let's look at the survey, community health needs survey. We attached the memorandum of understanding, the CFR regulations from the IRS, we've attached all those to our briefs. Nothing in the -- Did you hear this from plaintiff? Nothing in the CFR regs requires the Ottawa County Health Department to do anything. Nothing. This is an obligation on the local hospitals in the area.

Now, of course the county health
department can help, can provide input, can do all kinds of things, but their claim is it's a duty, Judge. Okay? There is no duty. The county doesn't have to do a thing, only the legal -- only the hospitals have the legal duty to do this community survey. As plaintiff admits in Paragraph 50 of her complaint, the local hospitals do this survey and they're going to do it with or without county involvement, and that's the key point. The plaintiff has no duty regarding the survey, but yet they put it up to you as, see, I'm being stopped from doing my job. When you have a non-duty? I don't understand. More -- Furthermore, and why we attached the agreements and the memorandums to our pleadings or to the briefs, plaintiff is requesting the county
spend directly over $\$ 31,000$ to pay for a survey it has no obligation to perform. The -- Again, the board has a legal duty to oversee all county spending. The county would also be spending an unknown huge amount of money beyond the 31,000 in additional funds because the contract requires the county to coordinate all the logistics of the survey, oversee all the contractors, manage and house all the raw data using county IT personnel and resources, arrange and conduct all meetings, serve as fiduciary for the project, be responsible for reporting requests and on and on.

Now, again, those all might be very good things. This board has not made a decision at this point because it's not -- it's not anything that has to be decided right away. They just ask for information, but yet plaintiff comes to you and says they need to do it now because I asked for it, because I told them. I'm the health officer, which she's not. But I'm the health officer, they have to do what I say.

All of this requires more county money and
resources. How much money is going to be spent by the health department on this project? Nobody knows, no one. I doubt plaintiff knows. The board has a
right to know and assess whether the county should expend funds on this program and how much it will cost. That's their legal job. That's what they're supposed to do. Nothing the board has done prohibits her from cooperating with the hospitals to move this project along.

Again, plaintiff seems to believe she's not subject to the board oversight and this violates MCL 46.11(k), because she has a duty to report to the board on anything they ask her about. Just because large expenditures and tax dollars are being questioned by the board and they ask for more information is not interference with her duties, nor is it inference with her non-duty in this situation. The board is not required to rubber stamp her open-ended blank check funding request.

Now, again, this might be a very proper, important survey thing to do and the board could decide here, yeah, we're onboard. We'll do it. But they can't ask questions? They can't ask: Well, we know it's 31,000. Is this going to cost us 100,000 because of all the man hours and all the other work we're doing? Is this going to cost us 200,000? I mean, they can't ask? Do you see how silly that is, Judge? But that's what they're claiming.

And then finally on this point, plaintiff admits in her own complaint, Paragraph 52, two of the three surveys have not even been fully developed or constructed yet, so they're not even done, and yet there's this urgency? They're obstructing her non-duty, because -- for -- for surveys that aren't even done? She admits at Paragraph 52 of her complaint, apparently the plaintiff believes the board's required to approve a proposal that is even not yet fully prepared. This would be an abdication of their oversight duty if the board did that and she knows it. The bottom line, Judge, this survey thing did nothing to interfere with the duty.

So now the last one, the grants. It's another spurious claim unsupported by any facts. Plaintiff does not allege a single grant that has been denied by the board, not one. Well, then how have they interfered? There's not a single grant. They don't even allege that it's been denied.

A hypothetical fear -- Because this is how it's phrased in their complaint, a hypothetical fear that some grant proposals might be denied in the future is not evidence that the board has interfered with her duties. Again, the board has oversight of all county expenditures.

The Brownstown Township case, Judge, I'll just refer you back to that briefly. Remember, that was the one Wayne County Sheriff, the county commissioner said we're not going to pay for road patrols. We're not going to fund it, because they had limited resources. The argument was, well, it's for the public good. It's for the public safety, public health. I mean, all good things. But the county didn't have the money so they didn't fund the road patrols for awhile. And so township sued, trying to force them to do it. And guess what the court of appeals said? Nope, they don't have to do that.

If funding of police road patrols by a county is not required and is a decision within the purview of the board of commissioners then neither is discretionary decisions to either accept or decline grant money or to expend funds for optional surveys or other programs outside the purview of the board. Plaintiff is not a law unto herself where she can unilaterally make decisions unfettered by any oversight by the board.

Now, plaintiff apparently takes umbrage at the board exercising their constitutional and statutory obligations. Apparently, in the past,
prior boards have not done this. She admits that in her complaint. We have not been micromanaged like this before. Well, Judge, I can't speak to what other commissions have done in the past. And if they shirk their duty or they didn't exercise oversight, that's on them. This board is going to do its duty. She's subject to their oversight, whether she likes it or not. Whether the board decides to renew the dental contract or let it lapse or to fund the hospital survey or not fund it is wholly up to the board's authority, not this Court, not the plaintiff. Legislatively, the statutes are clear, it's entirely in their purview.

And in that Wayne county Sheriff case, I just want to read this, Judge, because this is really on point and we cite it in our brief.
"Under the American system of constitutional government, it's the duty of the board of commissioners to raise the funds for government operation, distribute them among the various executive departments. Since public funds are not unlimited and every executive always needs more money than he or she can get, the matter of appropriations is a highly political one. For the necessarily
apolitical court to attempt to resolve such political disputes by legal methods would be the height of folly."

It's our court of appeals saying this. This court, that court of appeals panel said: We're not that foolish. The parties should argue this question to the voters. They're asking you to step in and micromanage the board, Judge, over their duties. That's not this Court's role.

So none of these duties that she's raised are actual duties of anything -- To begin with, there hasn't been any interference, despite their allegation. And they really, if you read carefully what they say, they kind of acknowledge it. And so once again, there are no duties.

Now as to the last point, the two counts, Judge, Count IV, Count V, again, I think this Court can rule on our summary disposition motion because these two counts don't really change anything. They can add 10 counts and it's not going to change the fact that she was never appointed as the permanent health officer back in December of last year.

But Count IV deals with two things. They want a declaratory ruling that she was appointed as the health officer. Well, that's duplicative.

They've already asked for that in Count $I$, so it's the same thing, so $I$ don't see how that's a new claim.

The second half of that count is the February 28 th resolution. She wants you somehow to declare that the board couldn't do that. Does she cite any law? Does she cite anything to say that you can step in and tell the board: You know what? I'm going to be the referee here and I'm -- I don't think you guys can do that. No. And we've cited all the law and everything that says the opposite. So that's a totally baseless claim.

So finally, we're down to -- Well, Judge, let me just say this. If this unlawful and inaccurate resolution controls, the prior board violated the OMA, as I've already said. This revisionist resolution was never voted on and it was done in secret. This is a novel argument that they can't do these things. We've been through it.

Now, the Whistleblower Act, another meritless claim, Judge. Think about this for a minute. This is a very specific statute on what you have to have in order to have a whistleblower claim. Again, these are -- No discovery is going to change these facts here. What law was violated by the
board? What law? None.
And plaintiff doesn't cite any law, a statute or something that our clients did that violated -- that was any kind of an illegal act in her original complaint on February $13 t h$ of this year. And remember, she says here in her pleadings, the Whistleblower Act is based on the notice she gave in her original complaint -- not the amended complaint, the original complaint. There's nothing in that complaint that says anything about any law being violated. There's not a single allegation. Retaliation, Judge, which you got to have, whistleblower cases, how is it retaliation when plaintiff claims defendant already demoted her back on January 3rd? Well, you can't be demoted twice to the same position. I mean, which is it? They're already alleging she was demoted. Our position, obviously, clearly is she was not demoted. She wasn't in the position. She was elevated. She was promoted to the interim position. So there's no retaliation.

The February $28 t h$ resolution did not cause plaintiff to suffer any changes. And this is, again, right in the act. Where have they alleged a change to her compensation, terms, conditions, location,
privileges or anything else? Do they allege she was discharged, threatened or otherwise discriminated against? No. There have been absolutely no allegations that she suffered pecuniary harm or anything else. This is all required by MCL 15.362. She has completely failed to properly state a cause of action. There are no disputed facts. Her complaint and resolution speak for themselves. No additional discovery is going to change these things. No additional briefing is going to change these things. This count is completely baseless.

So for those reasons on our summary disposition, we believe it's appropriate for it to be granted.

Now briefly on the preliminary injunction, I'll say -- I'm going to spend just a minute here on irreparable harm, because $I$ think this is important. Harm to the public is irrelevant to this factor and it cannot be considered. We cited the case law. And yet even here today, she talked about, well, I'm blurring them together. I'm putting four and one together. You can't do that. The first one is irreparable harm to the plaintiff alone and that harm has to be imminent and she has to have no adequate remedy at law. Well, what is she -- what's she
asking for, Judge? She's only asking for her job to be -- that she can stay at this job that she never had to begin with. But don't you have a remedy at law if you're wrongfully terminated as she claims she is? Of course you do. Damages. She has adequate remedies at law.

She claims she's been harmed to such a degree that she can't perform her duties, but yet I just went through all that. She's not been prevented from doing any duty. She knows the board's not interfering with her.

So what about all of these duties? Why didn't -- Why didn't the plaintiff ask for any injunctive relief on these points, Judge? No, no. It was only for her own self-interests, save my job, which she doesn't have, but save it, you know, let me stay it in. Tie the board's hands who did things the right way.

Why didn't she ask this Court to order the board to sign the dental contract if she believes they had a duty to -- you know, that that had to be signed right away? She hasn't asked you to do that. Why didn't she ask the court to order the board to pay $10^{\prime} s$ of thousands of dollars for this optional health survey that the county is not required to do?

She didn't ask you to do that. Why didn't she ask the Court to order the board to approve all grant applications without any review or oversight? Well, she's not asking you to do that. She's not asking. Why doesn't she ask the court to just order the board to approve any action she wants and every project she wants. Why not? Because she knows she can't ask for that relief, it would never be granted. She has no right to any of these things and she knows that. This puts the lie to her lawsuit, Judge. It's about her and her claim.

And again, I'm not casting aspersions
here. I'm not doubting for a minute that Ms. Hambley thought she was appointed. I'm -- That's not what I'm saying. But the reality is she was not. She was not appointed. That's why this lawsuit fails.

All the plaintiff is asking for in this injunction is her personal job security to a job she never held in order to allow her to do a job she now claims the board is preventing her from doing, which they're not. If there's no irreparable harm to her, to the party, she loses. You don't even have to look at the other elements, Judge -- the Woodhaven School District case, Page 2 of our brief. That's it. Case over. And she has alleged no harm for which she does
not have an other -- otherwise legal remedy, because she does. And again, I don't think she'd ever prevail on it, but she does have a legal remedy.

Now the likelihood of success, we talked about it for the last half hour, so $I$ think you understand our position.

The balance of the harms. There is no harm to her. Nothing has happened to her and she has not and will not suffer any harm. She's getting the full pay, the benefits. She has all the authority. She's the interim health officer right now.

But the board is directly harmed by the use or patience of its authority to appoint a health director. The board is harmed if the illegal actions of the prior board, OMA violations, are upheld. That harms my clients big time. Moreover, the board is directly harmed by the constitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine if this injunction continues. And that is crystal clear. Any violation of a constitutional right is always irreparable harm, always, even a temporary violation, Garner v MSU, 185 Mich App 750, 1990. A violation of their rights -constitutional rights, the board's rights, is irreparable harm.

The public interest, $I^{\prime} l l$ just say this.

There's no public interest in ensuring plaintiff as the health director or that she has job security. How is that the public interest? There is a -- And she wants -- I'm worried because these things aren't happening, then why didn't she ask you to do anything about it? So again, she's blurring this stuff, Judge. Don't fall for that. The only thing she's asking for is her personal security, her job, which she has other remedies to pursue if she wants.

There is a great public interest to not reward Open Meetings Act violations to ensure all laws are complied with and to ensure the board does not have its authority usurped in any way. That's a huge public interest. The board must be able to perform its statutory and constitutional duties free of any unwarranted interference for personal gain of plaintiff.

So for all these reasons, the injunction should be denied. Our motion should be granted. I'm happy to answer any questions that the Judge has, if you have any, Your Honor, but $I$ think we've laid out our position. Thank you.

THE COURT: Do you have a response?
MS. HOWARD: I do, Your Honor. There are
a number of statements by my brother counsel that I
think misrepresent what was in the briefs and what we've alleged in the complaint.

As I'm sure Your Honor knows, in our response to their motion for summary disposition, we talked at Page 8 and 9 about all of the cases that say a written resolution is what controls unless the language is ambiguous. The language here is not ambiguous.

Mr. Kallman also spent a lot of time talking about a variety of facts which we disagree with significantly. We think you can go straight to our complaint for the allegations and they're significantly different than what Mr. Kallman is alleging. He's alleging that the resolution -- the original resolution wasn't in front of the board when they considered it and voted upon it. That's not true. But nonetheless, if that's relevant, that's a fact dispute.

The reason why we subpoenaed Mr. Moss here today is because we believe he made statements against interest about my client's appointment and, again, that wasn't addressed by Mr. Kallman.

If the manner in which the resolution was drafted and signed is relevant here then that's a fact issue. But it was in front of the board at the
time they voted at a public meeting and it was signed by the clerk and the chair of the commission like all resolutions are signed. They're not signed by all of the board of commissioners.

Mr. Kallman acknowledged that the board can add an agenda item, which it would be ironic if he didn't because this board adds a lot of agenda items. The -- There is no question that this is the resolution that was in front of this group when they voted. And this wasn't a secret sneak attack, Your Honor. The county posted the position for three months, did a number of interviews for the candidates, and so anyone paying attention would have seen that this is what was coming down the pipe.

But, again, if it's relevant about how -how the resolution was signed, where it was signed, if the commissioners had it in front of them, if that's relevant, that's a fact question. I don't think it is; but if it is, that's a fact question. And if that fact question is relevant, that's why we gave a subpoena to Mr. Moss so we can ask him about the e-mail where he concedes she had been appointed and about other issues, Your Honor, but $I$ don't even think that's necessary. This is the resolution that was in front of the board, voted on and the language
of the resolution controls, as we stated in eight and nine.

And then it's unfortunate that brother counsel spent some time arguing about whether or not my client's interests were sufficiently pure. Even if she were only here about her own job, that would be enough. One's job is important and one's investment in their career is important. However, she has alleged there are a variety of things which she is reported to do under state law and that's why she's here and those things are important.

And to the extent -- Again, there's a lot of discussion about the ways in which -- we have four different ways we've alleged that the board and its agents have been interfering with her. And if that's relevant, we disagree sharply with some of the facts that were stated, and that's a factual dispute, if it's relevant.

But the larger point is that my client is going to do her best to fulfill the duties she has under state law, but there are a number of examples already of ways in which they've been attempting to interfere. And I think it's very clear from the beginning that they want to appointment their own person who is a political appointee, and that is what
the statute prohibits.
So for all of those reasons, Your Honor, I think it's appropriate to continue the TRO into a preliminary injunction and to deny both of the defendants' motions.

THE COURT: I've got a few questions. I'll start with you.

MS. HOWARD: Okay.
THE COURT: I have a few questions. So in

I believe their response, they made an allegation that simply entering the temporary restraining order conflicts with MCL $46.11(N)$. What is your response to that?

MS. HOWARD: It doesn't, Your Honor. So 46.11(N) is one statute that applies here and talks about county officers. That statute provides certain criteria under which an appointed officer can be removed from her job. In this case, again, we take the position that she was duly and appropriately appointed. So once that occurred, they could not remove her at all, demote her to interim or anything else, without following the dictates of $46.11(\mathrm{~N})$. That provides for a hearing and with respect to certain types of allegations. It requires a board finding or a board opinion about incompetence to
exercise her duties. And again, there's no way they had found that or had that opinion in the first 60 minutes after they had taken office, Your Honor. So none of those things had occurred here to appropriately remove her.

But $I$ would also mention that in this case, it's not just MCL 46.11(N) that applies. The larger public health code applies and talks about the ways in which you appoint a public health officer, and so that also is an overlay over 46.11 and requires that she be given the due process and the requirements that are talked about in 46.11 before she can suffer any adverse employment action. And being demoted to interim and a statement of "we intend to replace you in the future" is a very clear adverse employment action, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And so it's your position that
when that -- when that resolution was signed on $I$ believe it was on or about December 13 th, after the December 13 th meeting, she was then appointed the full county health officer, that's your position? MS. HOWARD: Almost, but not exactly, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Once she got the requirements? MS. HOWARD: Yes, Your Honor. Once the
two contingencies were met. Once she passed the background check and HHS approved her which, again, Mr. Kallman confirmed, nobody disputes those things happened.

THE COURT: So how do you account for the discrepancy that they're saying exists between the meeting minutes and the resolution?

MS. HOWARD: Well, I think the meeting minutes probably follow what $I$ would charitably say is the awkward way in which Commissioner Kuyers introduced this action. He talked about appointing her and he talked about passing the background check and the HHS approval. And $I$ personally think it is clear that what he intended was we are appointing her today contingent on these things happening.

But what is important is what is in the resolution that they all had in front of them is they were asked to consider that as the action of the board. They had it in front of them. It said: We're appointing her with these two contingencies. Nobody wrote anything later in secret. It was in front of the board. And again, if we have a dispute about that, that's a factual dispute.

And it has what $I$ would call a merger clause at the end that says if this conflicts with
motion, anything else, the written resolution controls. Again, pretty standard language for resolutions that are drafted and put in front of a county board when they're voting on something like this.

It's important to note Mr. Kuyers even came and said: Yes, what $I$ meant was this, not how you're viewing my statement now. To the extent the minutes took down anything talking about what he had to say, again, $I$ can see where that would happen, where somebody is following along and sort of transcribing what's said. But what they were asked to consider is what's in the resolution. There's no - -

If we -- if we were to go and look at everything someone said in introducing a resolution every single time a new board didn't like the resolution, we would be looking at videos of commissioner meetings all the time. That's why the case law that $I$ cited, eight and nine, is pretty clear about the written resolution controls. And there was no dispute about that or controversy about that until my client filed the complaint here and argued that they were clearly illegally demoting her and intending to fire her entirely from the position,

Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. So Mr. Kallman, was that written resolution in front of the board when that vote occurred?

MR. KALLMAN: Well, what $I$ can tell you is I -- I've not -- they've not alleged that. I've not seen evidence of that. What $I$ do know is they didn't attach the resolution to the minutes. They didn't insert it into the official record book of the board. It's not there.

And honestly, though, Judge, that is irrelevant. It doesn't really matter, because the minutes of the meeting itself -- And, you know, Counsel can say that the former commissioner was awkward in the way it was -- Well, you know, I guess that's her interpretation, but he read a motion into the record.

But all that doesn't matter. It's what got in here and what got approved and it -- this is what it says. And it doesn't say, you know, we have a resolution in front of us and we're going to -- you know, and it's going to be blah, blah, blah. It doesn't say that. It says Mr. Kuyers approved -moved to approve and authorize the chair and the clerk to sign a resolution. So it's giving them
authority in the future to sign a resolution to appoint plaintiff contingent on the three contingencies. It's that pure and simple, Judge.

THE COURT: Is that typically how they would do it, though, with the health officer? You would say, "we want to appoint this person" and then make them come back? I mean, why does that make sense that you would have a vote on the person? Of course they have to get the credentials from the state, pass the background --

MR. KALLMAN: Right.
THE COURT: -- and then come back. Why would you have them come back?

MR. KALLMAN: Because you got to get the credentials from the state. I mean, I don't know. I can't read their minds.

And $I$ know plaintiff keeps saying we want to get into the intent. No, we don't. I could care less about the video itself, because this controls and the video backs this up. But that's not what we're talking about here. It's the official minutes that control. And the resolution, again, can't trump what the board official action was. And the -- I'm sorry, Your Honor. Your initial question was -- I'm getting off on a tangent here.

THE COURT: Why -- why would they -- why would you come back again?

MR. KALLMAN: Right. Because under -- and we attached the rule -- we attach it in our exhibits from MDHHS, no one can be appointed as the health officer prior to our affirming that they have the credentials. So it is an impossibility for them. So in my mind, I guess that's the only thing that makes sense to me is that's why they put in here, well, it's subject to further approval by the board of commissioners, because we all know we have to get the approval from the state of Michigan and then we'll have a final vote. That's what it says.

THE COURT: But doesn't the letter from the State of Michigan say she's duly appointed?

MR. KALLMAN: Well, the state doesn't appoint her. The board of commissioners does, Judge. I mean, some extra language in a state letter -- I mean, the only thing the state is supposed to do is approve her credentials and they did that. They don't have the authority to say: And, therefore, we appoint her as the new health director of ottawa County. They don't have the authority. That's a violation of the law if that's the interpretation that they try to do. That's not what the -- that's
not accurate, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, why would they say that, then?

MR. KALLMAN: Well, because again, we're asking for parole evidence and for why certain people did certain things. I can conjecture that it was because when they were asked to get the credentials of Ms. Hambley approved that then in that same communication $I^{\prime} m$ assuming they said something like because we want to approve her and, you know, we had a meeting. We're all set, we just need your approval and so I -- You know, I can assume that.

But, again, Judge, it doesn't matter. I mean, what matters is the board acted December 13 th. These minutes were passed. That's the official record. The resolution was done after the meeting. It was not attached to the minutes. It was not signed at the meeting. Nobody alleges that. It was done later. And so it doesn't matter whether they did it later that day, five days later, none of that really matters. It's irrelevant, Judge. What controls is the clear language in the minutes and the clear language of the resolution which changed the minutes. That's what's relevant.

THE COURT: So when did Ms. Hambley then
start acting as the -- the health officer?
MR. KALLMAN: Well, I don't know. I assume probably sometime after December -- after the letter from MDHHS. And the fact -- Even if she did, if there was a week or 10 days in there where she was acting as the health officer because nobody contested it doesn't mean she was. I mean, just because she did it doesn't mean it was legal.

THE COURT: And the other comment you made

I think in your brief, you made a comment that -- I think it was on Page 2 of your reply brief in support of your motion for summary disposition, you state that "the plaintiff claims the chair admitted in writing plaintiff's appointment" and you stated false. Are you denying that he wrote that e-mail Or - -

MR. KALLMAN: No.

THE COURT: Are you just saying that he wasn't the chair at that time?

MR. KALLMAN: Exactly. It's irrelevant, Judge. Mr. Moss was not the chair. We're not denying that. I mean, I'll sit here today and say: Yeah, that was an e-mail. We're not going to contest that. It doesn't matter. He wasn't on the board. He wasn't board chair. He didn't have full access
to, you know, information and stuff. He wasn't getting cooperation from people at that point, so who cares? He's operating on what other people tell him. And because he just kind of throws in an e-mail, "well, $I$ guess since you're appointed", you know, that means she is? I mean, Joe Moss didn't have the authority to appoint her. I think that's a silly argument, Judge. I don't understand it, honestly. THE COURT: Okay. MR. KALLMAN: Again, we're not asking for any intent or anything to be -- you know, there's no reason and, frankly, you can't get into it under Tavernier and the case law we site, which is unrebutted by plaintiff.

And Judge, if $I$ could, $I$ know we go first, second, third, but we do have our motion. If $I$ could just take one minute and respond to a couple points that opposing counsel made. She says that I said the original resolution was -- No. What I said was the original resolution was signed after the meeting, that's what $I$ said. And I've seen nothing refuting what we said.

And again, it doesn't -- as I just said, it really doesn't matter because everybody agrees this -- the plain language of what was done says
they're authorizing them to sign a resolution, not we are signing a resolution as part of this motion in our meeting and the resolution is attached. I mean, where -- It doesn't say that. Judge, they can't - they can't make up, you know, theoretical things. It has to be what's in here.

Now, she says, you know, facts are contested. What facts? Did you hear her contest any of the main facts? Did she contest that's the action of the board on December 13th? Nope. Did she contest this resolution did not include the first contingency? Nope. The key facts that matter are uncontested.

Plaintiff keeps trying to muddy the waters and throw in intent and somebody stood up -- one of the prior commissioners stood up in a meeting and said: Well, that's not what we meant to do. Who cares? It's what they did do. You can not take parole evidence to change what they did. No parole evidence is permitted, Judge.

You know, the only question here is
whether the resolution matched the minutes, and it doesn't, end of story. Nothing else -- Everything else is just fog and glass and trying to muddy the waters up.

Again, our OMA and Lockwood and that whole argument, not a -- no response to those points that we're making, Judge, none at all.

And then this last point. She -- she throws this, oh, they're going to appoint a political appointee, you know, to the health officer. Well, what's Ms. Hambley? I mean, anybody who gets appointed to one of these positions is a political appointee. So if the prior board and the politics of that board and everything decided to appoint Ms. Hambley, that political appointment is okay. But when the new board comes on and they want to exercise their authority, they look at all this and realize she was never appointed and they want to exercise their authority, that's political. Come on, Judge.

And $I$ think resorting to those kinds of arguments $I$ think it's instructive and $I$ ask the Court to think about those things and realize there's nothing here because she was never appointed, pure and simple, end of story. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. And you're not arguing that she's doing a bad job at this --

MR. KALLMAN: No.

THE COURT: -- point in time? There's no issue with that?

MR. KALLMAN: Absolutely not.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. KALLMAN: And as we even said in our brief, whoever gets appointed -- You know, they keep harping on Mr. Kelly. His credentials have not even been approved -- haven't been approved or submitted yet. Our clients are looking at a lot of options. And we said in our brief including it could be Ms. Hambley. Now, $I$ don't know now all this stuff is going on, she might have deep six'd that. But you know, to argue that they don't have the authority somehow is -- is -- I don't -- I don't understand the argument. Of course they have the authority.

THE COURT: Well, what $I$ will do is $I$ will issue a written opinion as quickly as possible. And I'm going to leave a temporary restraining order in place until $I$ issue that -- issue that opinion. Okay?

MR. KALLMAN: Your Honor, if could ask one thing?

THE COURT: Sure.
MR. KALLMAN: Again, I know Your Honor is going to look at it all and come up with a decision. If the Court decides that you are going to issue a preliminary injunction, $I$ would request a stay for
purposes of appeal and so I would ask that the order include a denial of our stay if the Court -- if you make that ruling, Judge. Obviously if you don't, if you end the permanent injunction then it doesn't matter. But $I$ would make that request right now so that it could be included in her order.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. KALLMAN: Thank you.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, then.
The hearing is closed.
MR. KALLMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
Thanks for the time. 2:50:49 PM.
(Whereupon, proceedings concluded at 2:50:49 P.M..)

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STATE OF MICHIGAN ) COUNTY OF MUSKEGON )

I, certify that this transcript, consisting of 66 pages is a complete, true, and correct transcript of the videotaped proceedings and testimony taken in ADELINE HAMBLEY versus OTTAWA COUNTY, a Michigan County; OTTAWA COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS and; JOE MOSS, SYLVIA RHODEA, LUCY EBEL, GRETCHEN COSBY, REBEKAH CURRAN, ROGER BELKNAP, and ALLISON MIEDEMA, Ottawa County Commissioners in their individual and Official capacities, File No. 23-7180-CZ, on March 31, 2023, Videotaped.
**Please note proper names and/or case names unknown to this reporter are spelled phonetically and may not be correct.

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Michelle M. McKee, C $\bar{S} \bar{R}-\overline{3} \overline{8} \overline{4}$ Certified Shorthand Reporter

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